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 Section1: Introduction: 
 
Foreign Direct Investment, FDI henceforth, are “...international capital flows in which a firm in one 
country creates or expands a subsidiary in another...” (Krugman and Obstfeld p.169, 2000). These 
flows are important for countries that fail to domestically fund investments. Moreover, they 
promote economic growth by aiding in the diffusion of technologies and delivery of new ideas.  
 
According to economic theory FDI location is determined by transport costs and proximity to 
resources (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000). Also, concentration of related industries lowers trade 
costs, inducing agglomeration economies which lures future investment (Venables, (1996)). 
 
However, despite the theoretical framework concerning the effect of uncertainty on investment 
(Pindyck, 1989), crime and uncertainty stemming from it are rarely empirically tested as factors of 
FDI. The current paper contributes to literature by utilizing crime data to answer “whether FDI 
exhibited sensitiveness to crime across countries over the period 1998-2004 and whether this effect 
varied with countries’ wealthiness”.  
 
Intuitively, crime should lower investment since it raises probability of being victimized, causing 
investment costs to soar (i.e. insurance costs) without matching increases in real returns. The first 
part of the analysis answers whether this holds. The reasoning for nonlinearity across wealthiness is 
based on the Solow growth model, which states that low per capita output is a result of low per 
capita capital (Mankiw ch7, 2006). So, the marginal productivity of capital, MPK thereafter, in poor 
countries maybe higher. We thus want to test if higher MPK compensates for crime.  
 
This effort was fueled by FDI’s importance. In addition, UK was recently declared the European 
capital of violent crimes1, which prompted the author to ask how this affected FDI.  To address this 
question, principal component analysis is used to generate indexes capturing the Violent, Financial 
and Property crime levels within countries. We extend literature by being the first to generate 
indexes for property and financial crime. To the author’s knowledge this is the first time the latter is 
tested. However, our distinctive contribution is the examination of the effect of crime according to 
the countries’ wealthiness. The paper adopts the system GMM estimator to deal with potential 
crime endogeneity ignored by so far literature. 
 
We confirm previous work, by finding that only violent related crimes discourage foreign investors. 
Furthermore, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the effect of crime on inflows is homogeneous 
across countries irrespective of wealthiness. Our aim is twofold, first to ignite a discussion of 
different channels of causality for crime and economy. Second, we argue that to enjoy the merits of 
FDI apart from improving economic conditions, violent crime should be tackled also.  
 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. The next section initially discusses the main 
results of literature, while it concludes with a rigorous review of related research. The empirical 
model adopted along with implications and solutions follow. Section 4 describes the data, and 
finally section 5 presents our results and some robustness checks. The paper concludes in the final 
section. 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/5712573/UK-is-violent-crime-capital-of-
Europe.html 
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 Section 2: Literature Review: 
 
So far empirical literature has been plentiful in examining theoretical and other determinants of 
FDI. A consensus exists that Venables’ (1996) claim of agglomeration economies attracting 
investment indeed holds (Agiomirgianakis et. al. (2004), Hood and Young, (1997)). Others find that 
in contrast to labour costs’ fading effect, real exchange rates influence location decisions (Barrel 
and Pain (1997, 1999)).  
 
Some depart from traditional economic theory to find that government infrastructure and the legal 
system impact inflows (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). Furthermore, government itself can either 
through provision of public incentives (Barrios, et al., 2003) or tariff manipulation (Barnes and 
Davidson, 1994) alter a location’s attractiveness. Moreover, export oriented policies should attract 
more FDI, which is confirmed empirically with inflows being more prone to liberal trade regimes.  
 
The accelerator investment model, proxy of market size, is commonly found to explain investment 
variation sufficiently, thus reinforcing theory (Agiomirgianakis et al., (2004), Bhasin et. al., (1994) 
and Morrissey and Rai, (1995)). Less commonly absorbing capacity (GDP per capita) and rail 
infrastructure exert a positive effect (Agiomirgianakis et. al. (2004)). We refine Agiomirginakis 
et.al. (2004), who examined aggregate FDI determinants, by considering crime. 
 
Literature also suggests that noneconomic factors may determine inflows as a “good” institutional 
framework2 is valued by investors (Benassy-Quere et. al., (2005)). However, crime which affects 
property rights, was mostly ignored and “thrown” in the unobservables. A recent strand of 
literature, though, reverses the traditional causality and examines the effect of crime on the 
economy. Habib and Zurawicki (2001) established that if a country is perceived as corrupted then 
investments inflows fall.  More related though to our paper are Daniele and Marani, (2008) and 
Krkosk and Robeck, (2009), who acknowledged the correlation of organised and street crime with 
FDI inflows. While Peri, (2004) identified the macroeconomic consequences of murders.   
 
Danielle and Marani, (2008) focus on Mafia’s effect on FDI inflows in Italian provinces over a 5 
year period. Their main contribution is their Mafia index constructed from murder, bomb attacks, 
extortion, arson and criminal associations. Murder and bomb attacks are included to overcome 
underreporting of arson and extortion. They account for the slow response of FDI to Mafia attacks 
by lagging Mafia index one period.  
 
Krkoska and Robeck, (2009) use survey data in which businesses evaluated their experience, loss 
and perception of crime, to examine how perceived organised and street crime affected business 
investment and FDI. Perceived crime was instrumented on the experience and loss from crime.   
 
Finally, Peri, (2004) employs Italian provincial data for 40 years to investigate the effect of murder 
on economic activity (employment rate, per capita income). The paper’s distinguishing feature is 
the classification of provinces in low, medium, high and very high murder rates and testing whether 
the last three differ significantly.  
 
                                                 
2 Lack of corruption, and security of property rights 
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Overall evidence signifies the negative macroeconomic effects of Violent crimes. Daniele and 
Marani concluded that out of theft, Mafia and total crime, only Mafia is significantly negatively 
affecting FDI. It remained so even when controlling for agglomeration and GDP per capita, 
although Mafia coefficient halved. Their panel analysis controlled for market size, openness, 
infrastructure and incentives.  
 
The results of Krkoska and Robeck suggest that at national level experience and loss from 
organised crime affect positively crime perception, implying fear of recidivism. Furthermore, their 
panel analysis of 26 countries over 3 years indicates that perceived crime (organised, street) is 
negatively influencing FDI inflows even when controlling for market size, natural and skill 
endowments, and existing stock of FDI. An important contribution, showing that bad experience  
makes investors unwilling to invest. 
 
Lastly, Peri demonstrates the overall depressing effect of murders on economic activity. 
Furthermore, when provinces are classified only very high murder rate decreases economic activity, 
hinting that crime hinders the economy above a threshold. A panel analysis was followed, which 
controlled for the growth rate of the working population, civic involvement, Europe proximity and 
coastal province. Employment rate and per capita GDP in the start of period were included to 
capture any convergence trend.    
 
Overall, Daniele and Marani indicate that it is Mafia related crimes rather than total crimes that 
deplete FDI inflows. This implies that investors are not afraid of one off random crimes like theft, 
but fear of crimes that will hinder them on a consistent basis. An interesting result, which we test at 
the national level.  
 
Krkosk and Robeck made an important breakthrough by capturing the negative effect of perceived 
crime on FDI inflows. An influential paper, but with little observations. We build on their analysis 
and generate expected crime by using lags for instruments. 
 
Peri’s finding of nonlinear effects implies that the presence of very high crime levels exacerbates 
the true effect of low crime levels when pooled together. The present paper augments nonlinearity 
analysis by considering nonlinearity over country’s wealthiness.  
 
One point of criticism is that literature has ignored potential crime endogeneity and 
multicollinearity issues. Crime literature highlights GDP per capita, growth rate and education’s 
effect on decision concerning involvement in criminal activities (Barnett, 2008; Buonanno and 
Leonida, 2005; Donohue and Levitt, 2001; Ehrlich, 1975; Fanjnylber et al., 2002; Imrohoroglu, et 
al., 2001). Therefore, including them in the same specification with crime causes collinearity, but 
excluding them generates biases as their explanatory power is thrown in the unobservables, since 
they are correlated with crime. Although one period lag of crime is used, contemporaneous 
education level and GDP per capita are not unrelated to their previous period’s level, thus not 
perfectly unrelated to previous period’s crime.  The model and solutions adopted to overcome this 
and other issues are discussed in the next section. 
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 Section3: Empirical Specification: 
 
The present paper examines data on 75 countries over a seven year period, 525 observations.  As 
our data spans overtime we adopt panel data analysis, which exploits both the time and cross 
sectional dimension. To address our question, the two models below are estimated.  
 
ln
FDI
GDP i,t
= γ 1 lncrˆimei,t + ln xit′β + ai + ε i,t
              (3.1)      
          
ln
FDI
GDP i,t
= γ 1 lncrˆimei,t + γ 2 (poor * lncrˆimei,t ) + γ 3(mid * lncrˆimei ,t ) +
ln xit′β + ai + ε i,t     (3.2)            
Subscript “i” stands for country and “t” for year. is a white noise process distributed normally 
and independently with constant variance ( ).   encapsulates unobserved time 
invariant individual effects.  
εit
εit : IN(0,σε
2 ) ai
 
Natural logarithms are used to capture the elasticity of FDI with respect to different determinants. 
Also, coefficients measure the expected percentage increase in  for a unit percentage 
increase of the respective variable The dependent variable is FDI as share of real GDP, indicating 
the importance of FDI for an economy. FDI instead is chosen, because foreign investors are more 
likely to inflate news over crime.  
FDI
GDP
 
Measuring Crime  
‘Crime’ is categorized in three broad categories, each examined separately as Danielle and Marani 
(2008). Homicides, assaults and rape constitute violent crimes, the first category. The second 
category, Property crimes are measured by burglaries and thefts. The final category, financial 
crimes, includes frauds and embezzlements.  
 
However, each crime measure individually captures an incomplete snapshot, i.e. homicides portray 
violent crimes incompletely. Furthermore, tables A1-A33 depict that assaults are highly correlated 
with rapes, while burglary with theft. Frauds are, though, moderately correlated with 
embezzlements. We adopt principal component analysis4 5 to generate crime indexes for Violent, 
Property and Financial Crimes, so that all possible information is exploited when measuring crime 
levels and to solve collinearity issues.   
 
Table A4 provides the results for the “violent” index. The first two components have a cumulative 
variance proportion of “92.3%”, indicating their significance. “Component 1” weights positively all 
three elements, possibly measuring overall level of violent crimes with higher values implying more 
crime. Whilst, components 2 and 3 weight positively only homicide and rape, respectively. In table 
                                                 
3 Table numbers starting with “A” are in the Appendix. 
4 Original crime rates were normalized as follows: (X-min_x)/(max_x-min_x), by year. 
5
 PCA derives linear combinations of variables by using eigenvalues and eigenvectors.  
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 A7, component 1 is positively correlated with non-normalized homicide, assaults and rape. 
Subsequent analysis proceeds with component 1. 
 
Components encapsulating property crime are created with elements theft and burglary, in table A5. 
Component 1 explains “82.4%” of the variance proportion and both elements have positive 
coefficients, probably measuring overall property crime. The analysis utilizes the first component, 
which is positively correlated with theft and burglary rates, table A8. 
  
Lastly, Financial crime created with frauds and embezzlements is considered in Table A6.  
“69.7%” of the variation is explained by the first component, which weights positively both crimes. 
Although, component 2 is significant by explaining “30.2%” of variance proportion, we cannot 
rationalized the negative weight on embezzlement. Component 1 is highly positively correlated 
with both non-normalized fraud and embezzlement, table A96. 
 
To sum up, we employ the first component of each crime index, to measure the effect of the 
respective crime on FDI. We hypothesize that in model 3.1 all three crime indexes will affect 
inversely direct investment, since crime stimulates social uncertainty and weakens the enforcement 
of property rights. Also, it disturbs normal business conduct. 
 
The second model (equation 3.2) forms the main contribution of the present paper, where crime 
indexes are interacted with country’s wealthiness to test if the coefficient on crime differs across 
categories. Countries are classified into three categories based on their 7 year average GDP per 
capita. Poor economies are situated in the lower 25% of the distribution, rich in the top 25% 
(default case) and middle in the between. Two possible scenarios arise a priori; either rich countries 
have a better institutional framework, allowing them to enjoy certainty benefits and a steadily 
higher influx of investment, therefore will be negative. Or, higher MPK in poorer countries 
compensates for crime. Therefore will be positive. The current study evaluates which theory is 
more likely to hold with the latter seeming more attractive since crime itself upsets certainty.  
γ s
γ s
 
Control Variables:  
denotes the vector of control variables included. Literature argues that liberal trade regimes 
attract capital inflows. Hence, our control for openness (lnOpen), sum of imports and exports as 
shares of real GDP, is expected to positively affect inflows.  
xit′
 
Real GDP growth rate (lnDY) is also expected to attract FDI as it controls for market size and 
growth prospects which promote economies of scale. In addition, the inclusion of GDP per capita 
(lnY) proxies for purchasing power of host economy, however it’s effect is ambiguous as it may 
proxy for labour costs, as well. 
 
Krugman and Obstfeld (p.175, 2000) argue that the decline in dollar led to a surge in U.S. inward 
investment. So, we anticipate exchange rates (lnExch) to affect negatively FDI since they hurt 
competitiveness. In addition, some specifications include year dummies (Year) to incorporate for 
exogenous events i.e. Euro expansion. Efforts to dig out public incentives were fruitless, however 
last period’s taxes (lntaxt-1) are used. Higher taxes in last period should discourage 
contemporaneous location.  
                                                 
6 Saci and Holden (2008) follow similar description. 
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As a specification test we control for inflation (lnDeflator). High inflation should lower inflows as 
it decreases competitiveness. Moreover, measures of workforce (lnEduc) and infrastructure (lnrail, 
lnroad) quality are included, both increase the productivity capacity of an investment and are likely 
to increase inflows.  
 
A large pool of unemployed may imply cheap labour costs and is likely to encourage location, but 
high unemployment might, also, imply powerful unions (Blanchard p. 125, 2003) which hinders 
inflows. To examine the validity of these theories; unemployment is examined (lnunemp). Finally, 
previous investment both signals the quality of an economy and through reducing trade costs and 
increasing skilled labour generates agglomeration economies. Our paper uses a lagged dependent 
variable to capture the availability of agglomeration economies as in Agiomirgianakis et.al 
(2004) and Danielle and Marani, (2008). Previous investment should motivate new FDI. It must be 
noted that FDI data could not be decomposed to industry level. Therefore, cannot control for 
number of firms in relevant industries as a measure of agglomeration economies. 
ln
FDI
GDP t −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 
Econometric issues and estimation strategy:  
 
In what follows we identify econometric issues emerging and the estimation strategy pursued to 
overcome them. The first issue arises from using a lagged dependent variable and the data’s small 
time dimension that result to within and GLS estimators being biased and inconsistent (Verbeek 
p.377, 2008). To illustrate this, check that lag of is not independent of , invariant 
overtime, which biases 7.  
ln
FDI
GDP i,t ai
δ
 
ln
FDI
GDP i,t
= γ 1 lncrˆimei,t + δ ln
FDI
GDP i,t −1
+ ln xit′β + ai + ε i,t
  (3.3) 
 
 
Another issue is that growth rate and GDP per capita may not be strictly exogenous explanatory 
determinants of FDI and maybe driven by common shocks such as productivity. A further issue is 
potential crime endogeneity. As stated earlier crime literature identifies various socioeconomic 
factors to affect crime decisions. However, some of these socioeconomic factors also impact FDI. 
Therefore, one should avoid treating crime as exogenous and model any endogeneity. Moreover, 
property and financial crime potentially suffer from simultaneity with FDI, as increased crime may 
decrease investment but increased investment, by expanding job opportunities, may itself induce 
criminals to select legal jobs.  
 
These issues are circumvented by adopting the one step system Generalized Method of Moments 
estimator8, as proposed by Arellano and Bover(1995)/Blundell and Bond(1998). GMM estimator 
takes the first difference of a model. 
 
So:  
                                                 
7  For more discussion of Dynamic Panels see Baltagi (ch.5, 2005) and Verbeek (Ch.10.4, 2008) 
8 Roodman (2006) and Verbeek(p.383, 2008) argue that system GMM is more efficient. According Judson and Owen 
(1999) for Time<10 one-step variant is better. 
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ln
FDI
GDP i,t
− ln
FDI
GDP i,t −1
= γ 1 ln crˆimei,t + δ ln
FDI
GDP i,t −1
+ ln xit′β + ai + εi,t − (γ 1 ln crˆimei,t −1 + δ ln FDIGDP i,t −2 + ln xit −1
′β + ai + εi,t −1)
 
Δ ln FDI
GDP i,t
= θΔ lncrˆimei,t + ϕΔ ln
FDI
GDP i,t −1
+ Δ ln xit′β + Δεi,t
.  (3.4) 
 
 is eliminated, but is by construction correlated with , through . To avoid 
inconsistencies the endogenous variables  are instrumented. Strictly exogenous 
variables are instrumented by contemporaneous values. We use the system GMM, which exploits 
more information than difference GMM9. 
Δ ln FDI
GDP i,t uai Δε it it −1
lncrime, ln
FDI
GDP
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 
Crime and it’s interactions are treated as endogenous, using only the second lag as instruments to 
avoid weakening the test of overidentifying restrictions. In a weak sense expected crime is also 
captured. Growth rate and GDP per capita are treated as predetermined, so that contemporaneous 
shocks influencing FDI might affect them in subsequent periods, such that 
but . Therefore, these variables are instrumented by one period’s lag.  
E(Xi,t ,εi ,s ) = 0 ∀t ≤ s
E(Xi ,t ,εi,s ) ≠ 0 for all t > s
 
 
9 Under System GMM, “FDI” in the levels equation is instrumented on lags of ΔFDI  and in first differences equation 
ΔFDI is instrumented on lags of FDI. 
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 Section 4: Data: 
 
Source: 
Data on economic variables originates from World Bank’s World Development Indicators, where 
FDI is recorded in current US dollars. In contrast, real GDP (used for growth rate and GDP per 
capita), exports and imports are all measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars, while real exchange 
rates also use 2000 as their base year. Due to unavailability of capital tax rates, the analysis uses tax 
revenue as a GDP share to measure government interference. Furthermore, only education 
expenditure as a share of GDP was widely available, which is however positively correlated with 
literacy and enrollment rate (table A12). Unemployment was measured as a share of labour force10.  
Furthermore, World Bank database allowed the creation of two infrastructure variables; rail, 
encompassing total route in km, goods transported in millions of metric tons and passengers carried 
in millions, and road, encompassing total network in km and share of paved roads.  
 
Crime data is expressed in rates per 100,000 inhabitants and is sourced from the UN surveys on 
crime. As already stated principal component analysis is applied to generate the following indexes; 
Violent (from assaults, homicide and rapes rate), Financial (from fraud and embezzlement rate) and 
finally Property (from burglary and theft rate).    
 
Description: 
Table A10 provides some summary statistics on key variables from raw data. Two notes; first, the 
analysis deals with unbalanced panel. Second, expresses net inflows11, thus the negative 
minimum value. By merely taking the logarithm valuable information is lost. So, it is transformed 
to “ln( 1 + )” as in Chen (2004), so that negative values in raw data are negative in logs. 
Similar reasoning is applied with growth rates and crime, rail and road indexes whose minimum 
value is zero. 
FDI GDP
FDI GDP
 
As seen average , raised from “0.045” to “0.048” over the years examined resulting to 
“6.67%” increase. However, there was no upward trend as the mean of the whole series was 
“0.044”.  When breaking  according to wealthiness in graph 1, then mean is 
highest for rich countries. However, the standard deviation of poor and rich is highest suggesting 
large fluctuations. Note that “23%” of our sample are poor countries, “51%” are middle and “26%” 
are rich (Chart 1). 
FDI GDP
FDI FDI GDPGDP
 
Furthermore, table A10 reveals that average violent crime index experienced a “60.8%” increase. 
While, Financial crime index surged by “89.6%”. Finally, Property index grew from “0.34” to 
“0.464”, a “36.5%” increase. The increasing standard deviations may imply, though, that crime 
increases were not universal. 
Graph 1 
                                                 
10 Shares derived by multiplying percentages by 100 
11 Gross was unavailable. 
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Chart 1 
 
 
In graph 2 the slight negative correlation of  with last period’s total crimes12 (allowing for 
adjustment lags) provides some support to our examination. More informative, still, are the 
correlation coefficients of  with last period’s crime indexes, in table A11.   is 
inversely associated with Violent and Property crimes, but positively with Financial crime, which is 
puzzling but it could merely be that higher capital flows have increased the incentive to scam. The 
other two correlations confirm our earlier expectation. 
FDI GDP
FDI GDP FDI GDP
Graph 2: 
                                                 
12 It also includes drug trafficking and corruption 
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Further examination produces Graph 3 where average crime increases as countries become richer, 
confirming Donohue and Levitt (2001) in that crime increases in average income. Table A11 
supplements graph 3 by giving correlation coefficients of crime indexes with  for poor, 
middle and rich countries. Violent and property crimes are less negatively related with  
for poor relative to rich countries, but for middle countries the relation is even less negative for 
violent and positive for property. Rich countries could be more affected by crime since it occurs 
more frequently. 
FDI GDP
FDI GDP
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3: 
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Financial crime’s association with FDI has bizarre results. It varies greatly according to country’s 
wealthiness ranking, table A11. Poor and rich countries level of correlation is negative, whereas it 
is highly positive for the middle category. Although, the positive relation for middle countries is 
peculiar, overall we find some evidence supporting our examination for differentiated crime effects.
12
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 Section 5: Results 
 
In tables 5.1 and 5.2 one finds the results of models 3.1 and 3.2, respectively13. The joint 
significance (Wald), instruments overidentifying restrictions (Hansen) and serial correlations tests 
are also provided, which are satisfactory. First order serial correlation in the residuals is anticipated 
with system GMM, so it suffices to find no second order serial correlation14. The Hansen test is 
preferred, since it is robust to heteroskedasticity and is not weakened by limiting the instruments.  
 
In columns 1-3 of table 5.1, we condition for real exchange rates, openness, GDP growth, tax 
revenues of previous period, GDP per capita and year dummies, but the latter are insignificant. 
Columns 4-6 control for inflation instead of taxes, and finally columns 7-9 account for signal effects 
and agglomeration economies.  
 
Agiomirgianakis et.al. (2004) argued that an open trade regime is a necessary rather than a 
sufficient condition for attracting FDI. Nonetheless the positive and significant (except in columns 
7-9) effect of openness on inflows suggests that an open regime smoothens trade activities. In 
columns 1-6 a unit percentage increase in the openness ratio leads to approximately “0.035” 
percentage expected increase in investment inflows, confirming Danielle and Marani (2008). 
 
Furthermore, Barrel and Pain’s (1998) claim that growth rate matters is verified since we estimate 
the elasticity of FDI with respect to market size, to be positively significant ranging from “0.236” to 
“0.429” in columns 1-6. When a lagged dependent variable is included, in specifications 7-9, the 
effect is still significant but deflates. Finally, evidently signal and agglomeration effects influence 
contemporaneous location, because as seen in columns 7-9, the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable is positive and significant. 
 
Some of our results, though, do not comply with other authors. In contrast to Barrel and Pain (1998) 
and Habib and Zurawicki (2001), we find that real exchange rates, GDP per capita and inflation 
determine inflows insignificantly. The insignificance of inflation and exchange rates may hint that 
price competitiveness is not that relevant. 
 
Finally, unemployment, human capital and physical infrastructure are relegated in the table A13. 
Unemployment has an insignificant effect, while Expenditure on education proxies human capital, 
and our indexes on rail and roads measure the physical infrastructure. All three seem to be poor 
proxies as they change sign depending on crime used and when significant the interpretation is 
counterintuitive, i.e. increases in rail decrease inflows. 
 
Interpretation of Crime 
 
In Table 5.1 only violent crime (columns 1,4,7) exerts a consistently significant negative effect on 
inflows. In particular, a “1%” increase in the violent crime index is expected to reduce inflows by 
approximately “0.07%” thus answering our earlier question regarding UK’s inflows.  
 
                                                 
13 Table A17 lists all variables used and their source. 
14 When second order autocorrelation is detected two lags of FDI GDP are included. 
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 Property crime in column 3 and 6 is depressing inflows, whereas in column 9 it exerts an 
insignificant positive effect. Although in specification 6 property is significant, overall evidence 
rejects it as a determinant. 
 
What’s more we cannot argue that Financial crime (columns 2, 5, 8) exerts sufficient effect on 
inflows. The positive coefficient could merely indicate that they both increased over the period 
under examination, or it could be that financial crime increased a lot within groups of countries 
which is what biasses the results, we test for this possibility in table 5.2. 
 
In table 5.2 the results of our nonlinear model are presented. Agglomeration, market size, 
purchasing power, openness, exchange rates and inflation are controlled as suggested by literature. 
The diagnostic tests given (joint significance of the model, instrument validity and serial 
correlation) are deemed as satisfactory. 
 
When examining nonlinearities over the violent index according to country’s wealthiness, then for 
poor countries a unit percentage increase in crime is expected to have a “0.112%” more positive 
impact on FDI relative to rich countries. However, inflows are more inelastic to violent crimes for 
middle countries (“-0.054”) than for rich ones (“-0.0646”). Although, coefficients of poor and 
middle support a priori hypothesis about MPK compensating for crime, they are jointly 
insignificant. 
 
 As with the previous index, financial crime affects FDI more positive in poor by “0.205%” and 
middle countries by “0.043%” compared to rich countries.  However, poor and middle are jointly 
insignificant with statistic “0.27”, so evidence suggests that financial crime does not have a 
differentiated effect. 
 
Finally, Property crime results are dubious as they suggest that overall property crime increases 
foreign investment inflows for poor countries. Despite supporting our hypothesis, the net effect is 
far too positive leading to the conclusion that property crime regression faces some bias. This may 
be a consequence of only 17 poor countries providing the data needed to estimate the model. 
Different specifications were tried, however this strange result persisted.  
 
All in all, our finding that only violent crimes decrease significantly inflows confirm Danielle and 
Marani (2008) who suggested that out of violent (Mafia), property (measured by thefts) and total 
crimes only Mafia depressed inflows significantly. The insignificance of property crimes may be 
attributed to the ability of investors to easily protect themselves against burglaries and thefts. 
Financial crimes fail to gain frequent media coverage like murders, and as a result are not that 
preventive. Therefore, the positive relation found may imply that both rose overtime. 
 
Finally, we failed to find sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis of heterogeneous effect over 
country’s wealthiness. None of the two hypotheses made in the introduction seems to dominate the 
other with the one canceling the other off. 
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1 Null hypothesis: variables are jointly insignificant.  
2 Null hypothesis: instruments used are valid and not correlated with the residuals.  
3 Null hypothesis: errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no first-order serial correlation  
4 Null hypothesis: errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation 
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Same notes as previous table. 
Robustness checks 
 
In table A14 the model specification is altered to examine the robustness of our results. In columns 
1-3, Population and growth are used to proxy for market size and opportunities, as in Habib and 
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 Zurawicki (2001). While, in the last three columns customized crime indexes, lncustviolent, 
lncustfinancial and lncustproperty are examined. Within each index the weights are distributed 
equally and indexes within 0 and 1 interval.  Earlier results continue to hold as only violent related 
crimes seem to reduce inflows, though insignificantly. 
 
In table A15 the last specification of table 5.1 is estimated with difference GMM estimator. 
According to Wald test the variables are jointly insignificant. Furthermore, coefficient signs on 
open and real exchange rates change depending on crime tested. So, use of system GMM is 
validated as it offers more intuitive results. 
 
Finally, table A16 revisits hypothesis about differentiated crime effects, but for violent crime only 
which was the only consistently significant. In essence we examine only the possibility of different 
effect only for poor countries, where in column 1 poor are countries lying in the bottom 50% of the 
distribution, while in column 2 those in the lower 10%. However, as before we fail to argue that 
MPK compensates for crime. In other words cannot find evidence that poor countries are 
significantly less affected by crime. 
 
Limitations 
 
The most notable weakness of the present analysis is the use of reported cases as measures of crime 
rates. Potential measurement errors may arise, however this is beyond the tasks set to be dealt with. 
The use of net inflows rather than gross, is another criticism, but it was the only available.  
 
An important limitation is the failure of many countries to respond fully to all three crime surveys. 
Some countries reported homicides but failed to report to fraud (i.e. Australia), while others did not 
participate in two consecutive surveys (i.e. Armenia). We could have worked just with countries 
participating in all three survey, however this would limit the sample well below 100 observations, 
not accounting for the missing economic data, and degrees of freedom would be very low.  
 
Furthermore, countries that report crime data may be better organised, thus leading to possible 
selection bias, which prevent us from getting the true effect of crime. However, we did not 
incorporate for this potential bias, but if we had worked just with countries reporting consistently 
then our sample might have been even more biased. The argument for sample selection bias arises 
especially for financial crimes, because frauds need specific conditions both to be committed and 
detected. In other words some countries are more likely to report fraud rates. In particular, we find 
that average GDP per capita for countries reporting financial crime is much higher than those not 
reporting. So, financial crime’s positive coefficient may suggest something else.  
 
At this point one should note the unavailability of controls such as workforce education and 
government involvement. These are important determinants of FDI and their absence from the final 
model is a major concern. 
 
According to Kroska and Robeck (2009) and Habib and Zurawcki (2001) it is the perception of 
crime investors hold that matters. However, we could not derive sufficient determinants of crime 
that are orthogonal to FDI.  Therefore, we were unable to test whether effect expected crime differs 
from the effect of actual crime.  Expected crime should be more relevant as investors are likely to 
be affected from other variables apart from previous crime when determining the security level of a 
country. For example, there might have been an outburst of crimes but police responded quickly by 
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solving all cases which could offer a sense of security to investors. By just considering previous 
crime one essentially ignores other factors relevant to crime. 
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 Conclusions and Extensions: 
 
In conclusion, this paper utilized principal component analysis to examine crime as a determinant of 
direct investment flows whether this effect varies with country’s wealthiness. Crime was classified 
into Violent, financial and property. Furthermore, analysis addressed possible crime endogeneity. 
Our results cemented existing literature by confirmed that only violent crimes exerts a significantly 
negative effect on FDI. However, no evidence exists that this effect is alleviated for poorer 
countries. In other words, poorer countries cannot rely on higher MPK to cushion crime’s effect.  
 
Our results suggest that apart from accelerating growth and liberalizing one’s trade regime, violent 
crime should be tackled for one to achieve full capacity of FDI. Hence, devoting resources towards 
reducing crime is justified both on social and economic grounds. If crime reduction measures are 
successful then one can expect foreign investors to respond positively. 
 
The present analysis may be extended in several ways. One may argue that should have been crime 
changes are in the core of the analysis. Therefore, a natural extension of the present model is to 
examine how changes in crime rates affect investment. Another extension in an augmentation of 
Krkoska and Robeck (2009) by considering crime instruments that are orthogonal to investment 
such that the effect of crime expectations is captured. Investors are likely to incorporate other 
factors apart from previous crime when forming a perception about future crime level. Therefore, 
expected crime might have a more significant effect than actual crime on investment.  
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 Appendix 
Table A1: Correlation of Violent crimes 
Observations=312 Homicide Assaults Rape 
Homicide 1   
Assaults 0.14 1  
Rape 0.2046 0.7658 1 
Table A2: Correlation of Property crimes 
Observations=292 burglary theft 
burglary 1  
theft 0.6581 1 
Table A3: Correlation of Financial crimes 
Observations= 248 Fraud Embezzlement  
Fraud 1  
Embezzlement 0.3809 1 
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 Table A4: Principal Component Analysis Results of Violent Crime index 
 
Principal 
components/covari
ance 
  Number of obs 312 
   Number of comp. 3 
   Trace 0.175 
Rotation: 
(unrotated=principal
) 
  Rho 1 
Component Eigenvalues Difference Variance Proportion Cumulative 
Variance 
     
Comp1 0.1077 0 .0541649 0.6165 0.6165 
Comp2 0.05354 0 .041053 0.3065 0.9231 
Comp3 0.01344 . 0.0769 1 
 Principal Components(eigenvectors) 
  
 
 
Component weights 
Variable Component1 Comp2 Comp3  Unexplained 
     
Homicide 0.2745 0.9577 -0.0867 0 
Rape 0.58 -0.093 0.8093 0 
Assaults 0.767 -0.2725 -0.5809 0 
Note: comp=component; obs=observations     
Table A5: Principal Component Analysis Results of Property Crime index 
Principal 
components/covari
ance 
  Number of obs   287 
   Number of comp. 2 
   Trace           0.151 
Rotation: 
(unrotated=principal
) 
  Rho 1 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Variance Proportion  Cumulative 
Variance 
     
Comp1 0.124025 0.0975295 0.8240 0.8240 
Comp2 0.0264951  0.1760 1.000 
 Principal components(eigenvectors) 
 
 
Component weights 
Variable     Comp1 Comp2  Unexplained  
     
Theft 0.6972 0.7169 0  
Burglary 0.7169 -0.6972  0 
Note: comp=component; obs=observations 
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 Table A6: Principal Component Analysis Results of Financial Crime index 
Principal 
component 
  Number of obs 248 
   Number of 
comp. 
2 
   Trace 0.1231764 
Rotation: 
(unrotated=princ
ipal) 
  Rho 1 
Component   Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
     
Comp1 0.0859419 0.0487074 0.6977 0.6977 
Comp2 0.0372345 . 0.3023 1 
 Principal components(eigenvectors) 
 
 
Component weights 
Variable  Comp1 Comp2 Unexplained  
     
Fraud 0.6456 0.7637 0  
Embezzlement 0.7637 -0.6456  0 
Note: comp=component; obs=observations 
 
Table A7: Correlation of Violent index components with original nonnormalised variables 
312 
Observations 
Homicide assaults rape violent_comp1 violent_comp2 violent_comp3
Homicide 1      
assaults 0.14 1     
rape 0.2046 0.7658 1    
violent_comp1 0.2153 0.9097 0.8625 1   
violent_comp2 0.3421 -0.2747 -0.1178 0 1  
violent_comp3 0.0669 -0.1771 0.467 0 0 1 
comp= component 
Table A8: Correlation of Property index components with original nonnormalised variables 
287 Observations theft burglary property_comp1 property_comp1 
theft 1    
burglary 0.6606 1   
property_comp1 0.8874 0.8999 1  
property_comp1 0.3028 -0.4058 0 1 
comp= component 
Table A9: Correlation of Financial index components with original nonnormalised variables 
248 Observations fraud embezzlement financial_comp1 financial_comp2 
fraud 1    
embezzlement  0.3809 1   
financial_comp1 0.7547 0.8679 1  
financial_comp2 0.5736 -0.4848 0 1 
comp= component 
 
Table A10: Summary Statistics of raw data 
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Table A11: Correlation of FDI/GDP with crime indexes for whole sample and according to 
wealthiness of countries: 
Whole Sample  Poor countries Middle countries  Rich countries 
Crime 
Variable 
(last 
period) 
Obs 
Correlation 
with 
FDI/GDP 
 Obs 
Correlation 
with 
FDI/GDP 
Obs 
Correlation 
with 
FDI/GDP 
 Obs 
Correlation 
with FDI/ 
GDP 
Violent 266 -0.1224  46 -0.1318 136 -0.0367  84 -0.2797 
Whole period  1998  2004 
Varia
ble      
Obser
vation
s 
Mean Std.de
viatio
n 
Min Max  Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
M
FDI/
GDP 
505 0.043
6021 
0.054
3386 
-
0.092
5379 
0.460
9472 
 71 0.045
0789 
0.040
6847 
-
0.024
9252 
0.231
5015 
 72 0.048
1561 
0.069
4891 
-
0
5
Viole
nt 
312 0.295
9706 
0.328
196 
0 1.621
47 
 57 0.240
3401 
0.307
3047 
0 1.367
514 
 40 0.385
8981 
0.315
248 
0
6
Finan
cial 
248 0.330
1346 
0.293
1585 
0 1.224
669 
 47 0.223
1786 
0.227
1233 
0 1.030
627 
 34 0.417
2488 
0.317
5549 
0
Prope
rty 
287 0.393
3112 
0.352
2505 
0.000
0315 
1.288
678 
 55 0.340
4494 
0.337
9043 
0.000
0501 
1.203
853 
 38 0.463
6933 
0.385
0514 
0
1
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   Whole Sample Poor countries Middle countries Rich countries 
Crime Correlation Correlation Correlation Variable   Obs(last 
period) 
 Obswith 
FDI/GDP 
 Obswith 
FDI/GDP 
 Obs with 
FDI/GDP 
Correlation 
with FDI/ 
GDP 
Financial 211 0.0173  38 -0.2429 121 0.3409  52 -0.1946 
Property 243 -0.0523  35 -0.1786 131 0.1158  77 -0.3626 
 
 
 
 
Table A12: Correlation of education expenditure and other measures of human capital quality 
Variable  Observations Correlation with education 
expenditure 
Literacy rate 50 0.1663 
Enrollment secondary school 405 0.4055 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A13: Secondary Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES violent1 financial property violent1 financial property 
       
lngrowth 0.380** 0.262** 0.412** 0.446* 0.720*** 0.601*** 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.17) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) 
lngdpcap 0.00389 -0.00036 0.0135 0.00873 0.0187* 0.0096 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
lnopen 0.0280*** 0.0288*** 0.0371*** 0.0497*** 0.0453** 0.0506*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
lnreal -0.0435 -0.0231 -0.0148 -0.0651 -0.0817 -0.0573 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
lneduc     -0.0389 -0.0778*** 0.0293 
    (0.04) 
−1
(0.03) (0.04) 
lnrail    -0.107* -0.116** 0.0312 
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     (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
lnroads    0.0285 0.0485 0.0786* 
    (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
lnunemp -0.00075 0.00993 0.00778    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
lnviolent -0.0774**   -0.00325   
 (0.04)   (0.03)   
lnfinancial  0.0407   0.0173  
  (0.03)   (0.04)  
lnproperty   -0.0697*   -0.103* 
   (0.42)   (0.06) 
Constant 0.224 0.169 0.0355 0.147 -0.0117 0.31 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.15) (0.24) (0.39) (0.33) 
Observations 166 137 153 69 62 62 
Number of id 39 35 41 25 22 24 
Wald test of joint 
significance(
)-p-value  
0.000199 2.13E-09 1.93E-06 2.60E-08 0 8.56E-08 
First order serial 
correlation test  
0.00458 0.0174 0.00914 0.139 
χ 2 (k) 1
0.155 0.144 
Second order 
serial correlation 
test  
0.438 0.258 0.916 0.144 
2
0.152 0.182 
Hansen 
p-value  
0.506 0.874 0.707 0.948 
3
0.999 0.961 
Instruments 45 45 45 36 
4
37 36 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Null hypothesis: variables are jointly insignificant.  
2 Null hypothesis: instruments used are valid and not correlated with the residuals.  
3 Null hypothesis: errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no first-order serial correlation  
4 Null hypothesis: errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation 
 
Table A14: Robustness checks 
Robustness check      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES population population population Customised 
Violent 
Customised 
Financial 
Customised 
Property 
       
lfdi  
0.261** 0.379** 0.374*** 0.303** 0.317* 0.400*** 
 (0.125) (0.162) (0.125) (0.120) 
−1
(0.170) (0.128) 
lfdi  
-0.161   -0.0977   
 (0.221)   (0.209) 
−2
  
lnpopul 0.00122 -0.00013 0.000543    
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)    
lngrowth 0.118 0.23 0.226 0.260* 0.232** 0.292** 
 (0.184) (0.143) (0.138) (0.147) (0.095) (0.143) 
lnenroll 0.0149 -0.027 0.0171    
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.019)    
lnopen 0.0274* 0.0102 0.0167** 0.0226* 0.0157 0.00636 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) 
lnreal -0.0409 -0.0191 -0.00063 -0.017 0.00282 0.0277 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033) 
lndeflator -0.0033 0.000389 -0.00295 -0.00851 -0.0021 -0.00736 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
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 lnviolent -0.0559***      
 (0.018)      
lnfinancial  0.0566     
  (0.045)     
lnproperty   -0.0286    
   (0.024)    
lngdpcap    -0.00234 -0.00212 -0.0195** 
    (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) 
lncustviolent    -0.00569   
    (0.007)   
lncustfinancial     0.00173  
     (0.006)  
lncustproperty      0.0162** 
      (0.008) 
Constant 0.176 0.219 -0.0361 0.161 0.0458 0.127 
 (0.175) (0.278) (0.219) (0.145) (0.161) (0.172) 
Observations 123 130 147 129 139 156 
Number of groups 35 32 38 39 35 41 
Wald test of joint 
significance(
)-p-value  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
First order serial 
correlation test  
0.0535 0.0321 0.0178 0.0428 
χ 2 (k) 1
0.0353 0.0151 
Second order serial 
correlation test  
0.451 0.547 0.401 0.516 
2
0.403 0.281 
Hansen 
p-value  
0.573 0.661 0.456 0.763 
3
0.956 0.758 
Instruments 41 36 36 47 
4
45 45 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
1 Null hypothesis: variables are jointly insignificant.  
2 Null hypothesis: instruments used are valid and not correlated with the residuals.  
3 Null hypothesis: errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no first-order serial correlation  
4 Null hypothesis: errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation 
Table A15: Difference GMM  
Difference GMM.Dependent Variable FDI/GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES violent financial property 
    
lfdi  0.366 0.372 0.573 
 (0.414) 
−1
(0.272) (0.397) 
lngrowth 0.387** 0.408 0.0426 
 (0.183) (0.295) (0.26) 
lngdpcap 0.201 0.113 -0.202 
 (0.194) (0.159) (0.181) 
lnopen -0.0899 -0.0524 0.158 
 (0.0907) (0.103) (0.136) 
lnreal 0.0238 -0.00166 0.035 
 (0.0671) (0.0673) (0.0739) 
lndeflator -0.00327 -0.0163 -0.00871 
 (0.0436) (0.0491) (0.0362) 
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 lnviolent -0.180**   
 (0.0915)   
lnfinancial  0.111  
  (0.11)  
lnproperty   0.0664 
   (0.0834) 
    
Observations 118 95 108 
Number of groups 38 34 39 
Wald test of joint 
significance( )-p-value  
0.013 0.879 0.667 
First order serial correlation 
test  
0.0782 
χ 2 (k) 1
0.0411 0.0389 
Second order serial correlation 
test  
0.904 
2
0.758 0.235 
Hansen 
p-value  
0.23 
3
0.528 0.234 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
4
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
1 Null hypothesis: variables are jointly insignificant.  
2 Null hypothesis: instruments used are valid and not correlated with the residuals.  
3 Null hypothesis: errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no first-order serial correlation  
4 Null hypothesis: errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A16: Readjusting Wealthiness Threshold 
Readjusting Wealthiness Threshold 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Poor= lower 50% Poor= lower 10% 
   
lfdi  0.377** 0.262** 
 
−1
(0.164) (0.117) 
lfdi   -0.117 
 
−2
 (0.2) 
lngrowth 0.323** 0.277* 
 (0.130) (0.148) 
lngdpcap 0.00265 0.00575 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
lnopen 0.0154* 0.0242** 
 (0.008) (0.011) 
lnreal -0.0283 -0.029 
 (0.033) (0.033) 
lndeflator -0.00859 -0.00896 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
lnviolent -0.0499* -0.0574** 
 (0.030) (0.024) 
poor50pcent*lnviolent 0.0312  
  (0.027) 
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 poor10pcent*lnviolent  0.118 
  (0.123) 
Constant 0.179 0.173 
 (0.142) (0.158) 
   
Observations 168 130 
Number of groups 39 38 
Wald test of joint significance( )-p-
value  
0 0 
First order serial correlation test  
χ 2 (k)
0.0101 0.048 
Second order serial correlation test  
1
2
0.110 0.487 
Hansen 
p-value  
3
0.944 0.950 
Instrumentws 
4
55 53 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Null hypothesis: variables are jointly insignificant.  
2 Null hypothesis: instruments used are valid and not correlated with the residuals.  
3 Null hypothesis: errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no first-order serial correlation  
4 Null hypothesis: errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation 
 
 
 
 
Table A17:Variables used: 
Code Description Source 
Economic data 
lfdi Natural Logarithm of 
FDI/GDP 
World development Indicators 
lngrowth Natural Logarithm of GDP 
growth rate 
world development Indicators 
lngdpcap Natural Logarithm of Gdp per 
capita 
World development Indicators 
lnopen Natural logarithm of sum of 
imports and exports over GDP 
World development Indicators 
lnreal Natural Logarithm of real 
exchange rates 
World development Indicators 
lndeflator Natural Logarithm of deflator 
ratio 
World development Indicators 
lntax Natural Logarithm of tax World development Indicators 
lnunemp Natural Logarithm of 
unemployment share 
World development Indicators 
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Code Description Source 
lneduc Natural Logarithm education 
expenditure 
World development Indicators 
lnrail Natural Logarithm of rail 
index 
World development Indicators 
lnroad Natural Logarithm of road 
index 
World development Indicators 
lnenroll Natural Logarithm of 
secondary enrollment ratio 
World development Indicators 
   
Crime data 
lnviolent  Natural Logarithm of violent 
crimes 
UN 
lnfinancial Natural Logarithm of 
financial crimes 
UN 
lnproperty Natural Logarithm of 
property crimes 
UN 
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